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These macro-economic effects are however not discussed here they are simply taken for granted
In this article have different objective want to investigate the direct effects of modern transport on the nrms namely on their advance into the interior sections 1-4) their structure and organization sections 5-7) their withdrawal from the interior in the 1950 and 1960 sections and 9)
Modern Transport and the Advance of the Firms
Modern transport was
European introduction into West Africa The new means of transport were European-designed and constructed and also at least in the early decades European-owned and controlled There was conspicuous difference between modern European and exis ting African transport This dichotomy was blurred in the 1920 when significant numbers of Africans and Lebanese bought lorries and launches We return to this later. African transport was partly replaced by European transport but in many areas it continued to play role It is therefore useful to distinguish an Outer Trading Zone with African transport and an Inner Trading Zone with European transport and to call the boundary between the two the European frontier During most of the i9th century this frontier was on the coast Then with the intro duction of modern transport the European firms advanced inland and the Inner Trading Zone expanded rapidly Hopkins 1973 137 sq.)
The term advance reminds us of military operations but there is curious difference with regard to logistics While the rate of advance of an army depends on the ability of the quartermasters to send supplies up the advance of the firms was restricted by the opportunities to send supplies back Much of the firms thinking about this matter was condensed in the term produce evacuation
In general the firms were unwilling to buy and store produce unless it could be carried to the coast by European transport Going farther upcountry meant that they would have to rely on African transporters possibility which they seem to have rejected out of hand This attitude determined the location of their produce-buying stations upcountry Virtually all of them were built along navigable waterways railways or motor roads.1 These buying stations or trading posts or factories factoreries in French demarcated the European frontier2 which was transportation as well as trading frontier may add that it must not be confused with the frontier of the two-way trade i.e the far frontier of the Outer Trading Zone Many years ago Hancock 1942 204 pointed out that the European firms made use of three forms of transport river rail and road This distinction which is unimportant from the macro-economic point of view Sokoto in Northern Nigeria was an exception Ollivant opened buying station there in 1919 which relied on cam.el transport PEDLER 1974 97) This seems the most accurate interpretation of concept HAN COCK 1942 204) MODERN INLAND TRANSPORT IN WEST AFRICA 549 will be repeatedly used in this article Its significance was brought home to me by related distinction which the employees of the firms often used in conversation When talking about their buying stations they dis tinguished river stations line stations along the railway line) and road or outstations At first thought that this referred merely to location but later understood that it derived from the method of produce evacuation river station was designed and built to rely on wate transport line station often with separate railway siding depended rail transport and road station on evacuation by lorry It is therefore desirable to distinguish three types of advance of th firms river-based railway-based and road-based one Each of these will be discussed in turn in the next three sections
Since the new means of transport did not become available at the same time we can also recognize three different phases of advance the river-based advance started around 1880 the railway-based one soon after 1900 and the roadbased one in the 1920
Since conditions in West Africa varied from country to country the years given here should be seen as rough indication only
The River-based Advance
In the course of the i9th century inland navigation of the European type was introduced on the West African rivers European firms and governments began to send vessels to West Africa in order to employ them there permanently
In East Africa the start of European inland navigation was spectacular because the first European vessels had to be carried in sections overland before they could be launched on the lakes And the same was true for the Congo in the centre of the continent Some West African waterways resemble the East African lakes because they are also cut off from the sea on these the beginning of European navi gation is properly recorded on the Middle and Upper Niger it began in 1884 see below and on the Nyong in South Cameroun in 1906 Wirz 1972 But most of the West African rivers are connected with the sea which makes it difficult to discover when inland navigation as distinct from sea navigation began
The literature on this period does not speak about inland navigation as such but it offers some help when one compares the names given to the different types of vessel
The most common name is steamer bul unfortunately this does not help us much because it is used for ocean-going ships as well as large river vessels
Technically there were three catego ries of steamer some were propelled by screws some by side paddles and some by paddles or wheels at the stern The vessels of the last category i.e stern-wheelers and quarter-wheelers were not seaworthy They were good examples of vessels that were permanently stationed in Africa Other examples were the barges Unfortunately none of my sources indicated when these vessels made their nrst appearance in West Africa.3 Presumably the composition of the river fleets gradually changed the number of ocean-going ships decreased and the number of river vessels i.e vessels that were not seaworthy increased This trend was fostered by developments in steamship design which favoured the construction of larger ships As these were too big for the West African rivers the separation of sea and inland navigation became complete.4
Another result of the emergence of river fleets was the development of entrepot ports at the mouths of the rivers Early references to special vessels are to be found FLINT 1960 i2i) and PE LER 1974 159-160) The incursions of ocean-going ships remained cause of concern for the owners of river fleets on the Lower Niger the Gambia and the Senegal The temptation to invade the rivers was greater when ocean freight rates were low It was real concession of Elder Dempster when it promised the Niger Company in 1907 to stay away from the river DAVIES 1978 83) This was the Compagnie du Sénégal et de la côte occidentale de Afrique thé predecessor of CFAO which more attention should be given to transport technology logistics and the actual investments of the British and French businessmen Senegal There has been long history of European navigation on this river mainly with ocean-going ships Curtin 1975 but in 1879 the Senegal acquired new significance because the French government declared its support for the Senegal-Niger railway
The French envisaged an enormous transportation axis into the heart of West Africa which entirely relied on European transport navigation on the Senegal from Saint-Louis to Kayes railway from Kayes to the Niger and inland navigation on the Middle Niger The French must have been confident about the possibilities for European navigation on this river otherwise the decision to build railway made little sense Construction began in 1881 Meniaud 1912 45 but progress was slow
To strengthen their claim on the Middle Niger the French decided to launch vessel on the river before the railway was completed For this purpose they organized an expedition which carried launch in parts from Kayes to Bamako In August 1884 this vessel made its maiden voyage on the Niger ibid. no) second launch was transported in the same way in 1888 ibid. ni Although these were military vessels they indirectly served commercial purpose because they confirmed the navigational possibilities of the Niger The advance to the Niger boosted navigation on the Senegal which interestingly enough remained mixture of sea and inland navigation In the short high-water season ocean-going ships ascended the river to Kayes but there was also proper river fleet which operated from SaintLouis and belonged to the Compagnie des messageries africaines It was supplemented on the upper river by two government-owned sternwheelers ibid.
Gambia
The modernization of navigation on this river began in 1882 when the leading British firm the River Gambia Trading Company bought river steamer and steam launch Pedler 1974 62 It was this firm8 which had started buying groundnuts on the upper river three years before after local wars had kept European traders away for long time ibid. 59
The new steamer was expected to speed up groundnut evacuation enabling the firm to take the lead over its French rivals ibid. 62) Oil Rivers/Niger Delta Some British firms established factories in this area in the s.9 Although none of these factories was farther from the coast than fifty miles they represented genuine advance run it lowered handling charges on the exports which the railway generated The railways were major factor in the process of port concentration which took place West Africa in the period 1900 -1925 Taaffe et al 1963 506-507 White 1959 But there were other factors as well The new submarine telegraph cables connected only limited number of coastal towns with Europe15 and these towns were chosen as ports of call for the mail steamers because letters and cables were supplementary ways of communication they were further preferred as places of residence by the colonial governors All this led to concentration of activity in few ports
These four factors modern port the telegraph cable to Europe the mailboat and proximity to the colonial administration made these towns excellent bridgeheads for the commercial advance into the interior In most of the nine countries served by the railways of Having sketched the circumstances we should now try to document the actual advance of the firms Unfortunately there is very little specific information There are few useful regional studies such as that on Kano where the advent of the firms is given in detail including the competition for superior sites close to the railway station Hogendorn 1978 59-61 Yet fairly complete reconstruction of the advance seems possible First there are the reports and archives of the big firms.16 guess that about half the desired information can be found there but of course data on unincorporated enterprise and firms that failed long ago will be missed in this way Secondly in most countries land rights obtained by foreigners were registered by the colonial administration From these registers we can learn which firms obtained land in the railway towns For Sierra Leone such study has recently appeared TubokuMetzger Van der Laan 1981 cf Richards 1977 210-215 Thirdly one can search contemporary periodicals for news possibly in the form of advertisements The search can be limited to few years following the opening of the various railway stations Finally one can visit the railway towns to inspect the buildings that are still there Photographs and the memories of elderly inhabitants may yield information on the buildings that have disappeared 15 The first two cables were laid between 1884 and 1886 connecting with Europe dozen coastal towns from Saint-Louis to Luanda BRIGHT 1898 134-135) CoQUERY-ViDROViTCH 75 î2 has two maps showing the buying stations of CFAO and SCOA in 1924 based on company reports My own observations in the railway towns of Sierra Leone suggest that all buying stations had been made from imported building materials such as sawn timber corrugated iron sheets and cement Since these mate rials were carried by rail construction must have taken place after the railway had been opened to traffic
The construction techniques were sound because many buildings weathered the storms for sixty years My impression was also that the buildings were rather large Presumably the nrms were optimistic about the volume of trade Another remark able feature of these buildings is the height high roof enhanced ventilation and helped to dry produce On the whole the nrms took the investment in line stations seriously
The firms assessed the produce potential of an area before they decided to build buying station If it was low they shied away from the area It was possible therefore to find railway towns or even string of them without single buying station But in some promising towns one could find dozen firms represented For the big firms it was matter of policy to open station in every promising town
The majority of firms however could not afford such comprehensive network
The Road-based Advance
The lorry the third significant representative of modern inland transport made its appearance in West Africa in the first decade of this century
Since the teething troubles of the lorry deterred businessmen public ownership was the rule at first
The railways in Nigeria for instance established motor transport service in 1907 which was expected to increase rail traffic Hay 1971 97
Some traders seem to have responded to the new transport services by opening road stations but for all practical purposes the pre-1914 advance may be ignored better and lighter type of lorry developed by the Ford Company in the 1910 reached West Africa soon after World War When the British and French recognized the value of the new lorries they switched over from rail to road construction although several pre-war rail projects were still continued.17 Since roads complete with bridges and ferries took time to build the impact of the lorry was not everywhere felt at once
In the cocoa areas of the Gold Coast Gould 1960 66-68 Hill 1963 i7 234 11 in the Sudanie belt18 the lorry age began around 1920 elsewhere in the mid-i s.19
In general the new motor roads were short stretches of road which originated in rail or river town This starting point was important for two reasons First it made it easier for the engineers to begin construc- The analogy with railway construction is obvious. Secondly it was in these towns that lorry was unloaded from the train or the steamer in order to start its operations on the new road Normally lorry would remain on its road until it was beyond repair.20
The new roads were conceived as additions to the existing rail or river transport system
In keeping with the European preoccupation with produce evacuation they were called feeder roads because they were expected to feed more produce to the railways or the river fleets).21 Many roads were built at right angles to the railway line or the main course of the river This was the most promising way to reach areas which until then had not participated in trade Information on road construction in the may be found in official reports but it is not so easy to get information on the number of lorries that operated on these roads or on the number of trading posts that were built along them few things are clear however Practically all the new lorries were privately owned in contrast to the situation before 1914
Moreover the majority was bought and operated by small traders see section These traders were also responsible for the establishment of most of the trading posts along the new roads The road-based advance was therefore primarily the work of small traders and not of the big European firms However limited the role of the firms was some features of their advance should be mentioned here When firm decided to establish one or more road stations along new feeder road the station manager in the town where the road began was made responsible for the execution of this plan He also became the boss of the men who were put in charge at the new road stations which were often seen as satellite stations This hierarchy also reflected in produce bulking led to the use of the term outstation The Organization River Firm river firm may be defined as trading firm which relies on water transport for the evacuation of its produce and which uses its own vessels to effect the evacuation This definition is useful when applied to single country When more countries were involved problems arose because it could happen that company operated as river firm in one country and as railway firm in another CFAO for instance was river firm in the French Soudan but railway firm see section in the Gold Coast
The river firm is not merely theoretical model for some firms fitted 20 heard of lorries which were railed to Freetown on low-loader to be repaired the workshop After repair they were railed back to their old feeder road 21 Perhaps LUGARD 1926 475-476 was the first to use this word in the West African context Cf 1926 128. Governors were anxious to increase exports as well as railway revenue feeder roads served both purposes the definition for at least number of years for example the Royal Niger Company and the River Gambia Trading Company see section But of course in most situations the real firms deviated from the model to lesser or greater extent It is nevertheless instructive to start with discussion of model river firm river firm needed great many assets First there were the vessels steamers launches tugboats barges etc.
Secondly there were ancillary facilities such as fuel dumps with wood coal petrol or diesel oil and repair and maintenance yards Thirdly warehouses and loading and unloading equipment had to be installed in the entrepot ports Most of these were on the coast at Saint-Louis Bathurst Ada Akassa and Burutu but some were in the interior at Bamako Koulikoro Kouroussa Kankan etc.).22 Fourthly buying stations had to be established along the rivers some of these had to be equipped with wharves or jetties These assets required the investment of large sums of money which were irrevocably committed because most of these assets could not be removed and taken back to Europe Even the steamers were not so movable as they seemed at first sight This was especially true if they had been designed to cope with the problems of particular waterway Such vessels could not be used elsewhere An investor had to be quite convinced before he poured his money into fleet of river vessels some where in Africa
On the other hand having built up river firm an investor was extremely reluctant to reduce or abandon it
The personnel of river firm consisted of the crews the men in the buying stations and those in the entrepot port Normally the head quarters were located in the entrepot port thus concentrating many employees in one town
The directors had to take many decisions with regard to their personnel What kind of people should they recruit for the fleet and the stations If they wanted Africans did they take local men or strangers How many Europeans were needed on each vessel and in each station Could Africans be put charge of some vessels and stations The selection of station managers was special problem because they had to work independently as they could not readily contact their boss At the same time general manager wanted to retain overall control by giving them detailed instructions before they assumed duties Messages from the general manager to the station manager and vice versa were carried by the vessels This assured regularity while in emergencies vessels could be diverted to carry message On some rivers such as the Benue and the upper Senegal navigation was impossible for part of the year The station managers along these rivers were cut off for many months It was the interest of the firm to send steady experienced and loyal employees to these places
The period without navigation also complicated the evacuation of 22 The largest interior entrepot ports of Africa were at Kisumu and Leopoldville produce It was particularly unfavourable if the low-water season occurred just after the harvest season because in that case the station manager could not dispatch the quantities he had bought until several months later
He needed large store and the firm needed additional capital to finance such immobilized stocks river firm faced dilemma in this matter
If it kept its fleet small it needed lot of working capital to finance stocks upriver On the other hand if it speeded up evacuation in order to save working capital it needed more vessels And the optimum solution for this exercise depended on fluctuating produce price We must remember that two groups of people were involved in this exercise the directors in Europe and the general manager in Africa The latter was more concerned about fixed capital and its deployment and the former about working capital bank loans and liquidity Fre quent contact between the two groups by letter and cable was essential in order to have consistent policy
How does this picture of model river firm compare with the historical evidence Let us first take the Royal Niger Company river firm about which fair amount has been published Flint 1960 325-328 and Pearson 1971 80-83 discuss the finances of the RNC but point out that the company operated two accounts trading and an administrative one and they warn that the directors had every reason to debit expenses against the administrative account which reduces the reliability of the figures Pedler 1974 169-170 discusses the personnel policies of the RNC which employed many Africans in responsible positions23 put great emphasis on loyalty and trust and abstained from strict control ibid. 184-185
Pedler ibid. 158 also discusses the produce evacuation pro gramme24 but does not mention the absorption of working capital in stocks upriver. 25 What found lacking in the published accounts is the matter of internal communication How were messages sent from London to Akassa before 1886 26 And were telegrams sent via Lagos or Bonny after submarine cables had been laid to these ports 27 How were messages sent from Bonny to Akassa and from Bonny to the headquarters at Abutshi And between Akassa and Abutshi And how was this wide spread organization in the interior kept together and efficiency maintained?28 The Organization of Railway Firm railway firm may be defined as firm which relies exclusively on rail transport for the evacuation of its produce from particular territory railway firm unlike river firm did not have to invest in means of transport
In general the railway firms therefore needed less capital for given volume of produce trade than the river firms
The barriers to entry were therefore lower in the railway period than previously which means that many new entrants could be expected in this period Some new entrants were completely new to West Africa but we should not overlook another category i.e old firms that expanded laterally along the coast In the railway colonies where they began operations for the first time they were genuine new entrants One feature of the new railway lines is often overlooked They were equipped with telegraph system to smooth operations In nearly all colonies this system was opened to the public.31 This created ideal circumstances for internal communication in the firms general manager could easily send brief messages to his station managers and the latter could reply at once Changes in buying prices could be passed on without delay
Moreover with up-to-date knowledge of up-line stocks and purchases general manager could improve his exportation Prior to this employers preferred men with African experience not only because of their knowl edge but also because they had shown certain resistance to tropical diseases After about 1900 the firms reluctance to employ newly arrived European became less And of course more and better candi dates were willing to go out Not only was the overall risk less but an employee of railway firm had better chance to get proper medical care If he fell ill he could be put on the train and travel in comfort to hospital All these changes led to process of europeanization in the railway firms in the period before 1914
As the railways operated regardless of the seasons the managers of the line stations could rail produce to the export harbour regularly and frequently
The general managers did not have to worry about immo bilized up-line stocks unless big harvest exceeded the capacity of the railway
The railway firms made full use of the opportunities for rapid produce evacuation.32 In this way they had to finance their upcountry purchases for shorter period which meant that they could use their working capital several times in succession during buying season with favourable effects on annual profits This move enabled them to become railway firms
In the light of the analysis above it is clear that the Niger Company as Delta-based river firm was seriously handicapped in its struggle against the Lagos-based railway firms
The directors presumably realized that they could never operate as efficiently as the railway firms At the same time they could not give up their principal investment the river fleet.38 It must have been great relief for them when buyer appeared on the scene The story of the takeover by Lever Bros in 1920 is well known as well as the fact that it was poor bargain for Lever Pedler 1974 183-185 After the takeover the head quarters of the Niger Company were moved from Burutu to Lagos ibid. 185) the river port gave way to the railway port
The preference for the railway was strong but it was neither general nor permanent When produce prices were very low as they were in the the firms turned again to evacuation by water for instance 35 It was in those countries that the terminology of the river-based advance carried over into the railway phase
In Senegal the railway towns were called escales and in Nigeria beach was used for many line stations curious extension of the meaning of these words 36 There was comparable decline of water transport in East Africa transport on Lake Victoria and trafne in Kisumu port fell when the Ugandan railways were linked up with those of Kenya At that time the general managers in Africa resented the strict control which their directors exercised over them ibid.).39 But of course there must have been an earlier phase in which the general managers them selves increased their powers over the station managers
The extent of centralization in the firms is well illustrated by the cocoa buying agreement of 1937
The signatories to the agreement undertook to work with identical price schedules which could be adjusted from day to day Decisions on price changes were taken in London by one man! and relayed by telegraph to the station managers in the Gold Coast and Nigeria Noweli Report 1938 138).40 would like to suggest that river firms could never have achieved such centralization Indeed the image of the heavily centralized expatriate firm was strongly influ enced by the railway firms The bsence of Substantial Road Firms road firm may be defined as trading firm which employs only lorries for the evacuation of its produce Such firms could be expected to develop in ports with road-based hinterland But these conditions were rare in West Africa because the colonial governments were reluctant 39 HANCOCK 1942 217 notes that general managers had to wait for cabled instructions about prices Did the general managers complain about this their conversations with Hancock 40 Only buying stations close to telegraph or telephone could be included in the new scheme to build new ports the inter-war period and preferred the existing ports to remain dependent on rail or river transport.41
In the few countries which lacked rail and river transport such as Liberia road construction created favourable conditions for road firms In some other countries peripheral areas began to develop on their own because of road construction and the re-opening or revival of port.42 But taking West Africa as whole opportunities for road rms as denned above were small None of the older European firms was attracted by them and none of the smaller traders who made use of these opportunities grew out to the size of the older firms
The commercial scene did not change therefore in the inter-war period railway and river firms continued to dominate the export trade There were some internal changes however in these firms Many of them bought some lorries to supplement their operations Thus they ceased being pure rail or river firms and became kind of hybrid firm But it must be remembered that they considered produce evacuation by lorry minor operation which was merely supplementary to evacuation by rail or river
The Halting Frontier of the European Firms
The advance of the firms could not go on indefinitely
We should therefore ask when did it stop Or to use the terminology of Hancock when did the traders frontier come to halt Hancock himself presum ably believed that the frontier was still moving forward when he visited West Africa in 1938-39 but this was almost certainly incorrect.43 Using modified frontier concept Hopkins 1976 280 has suggested that it came to halt in the 1920 My own research 1978 32-33 points to the same decade and data on two French firms appear to confirm this taking the number of their buying stations as yardstick SCOA ceased to advance in 1924 and CFAO in 1930 Coquery-Vidrovitch 1975 .44 But why did the frontier come to halt in the And who took the decision Hopkins 1976 280-283 looks for an explanation in the board rooms in Europe
The corporate revolution the search for security and the transition to bureaucratic forms of organization greatly influenced the business world of the industrial nations in the inter-war period and the directors of the firms trading in West Africa did not escape 41 They favoured road which prevented the lorries in the interior from reaching railway port For road gaps in the Gold Coast see GOULD 1960 44 71) 42 This happened in southern Sierra Leone VAN DER LAAN 1978 29 and in the Gold Coast GOULD 1960 56 68 The Woermann Line and the Holland West Afrika Line the smaller lines in the West African Shipping Conference contributed to the revival of some small ports by regularly calling at them 43 Hancock did not distinguish the frontier of the two-way trade which continued to move forward from the European frontier 44 Later in the the number of trading posts of the two firms increased again COQUERY-VIDROVITCH 1975 6o8) but suspect that the additional posts belonged to tied traders see below operating in buildings which were not owned by the firms this new mood It seems to me however that the general managers in West Africa also bore part of the responsibility for the halting frontier even considerable part note that directors and general managers did not think and operate on the same scale Put simply the average director had map of Africa in his office whereas general manager had map of one country only namely the country in which he was responsible for the operations In the remainder of this section the general manager is the central figure the man who determined the policies which brought the frontier to halt
The frontier remains vague concept unless it is related to activities or investments which can be plotted on map This turns our attention to the buying stations which more than anything else demarcated the firms frontier
What was the attitude of the general managers of the with regard to these buying stations It seems to me that they gladly accepted the river and line stations which they inherited from their predecessors but were reluctant to operate road stations and confident that they could do without them This interpretation occurred to me during my research in Sierra Leone where only few road stations had been established by the firms.45 There are good reasons for accepting this interpretation for the whole of West Africa Road stations had several disadvantages for railway firm First they could not be properly run unless the firm also owned lorries And these assets brought whole set of complications How could proper maintenance and repair be provided There were very few motor mechanics in Africa at the time while the roads caused lot of mechanical trouble And who was to drive the lorries The British firms seem to have felt that lorry driving was below the dignity of the White man and they never employed British drivers in Sierra Leone.46 assume that they adopted the same policy elsewhere in West Africa.47 It is interest ing that other firms held different view have heard of French and Swiss lorry drivers in Sierra Leone in the inter-war period but must add that these men were not employed by CFAO or SCOA If firm rejected the idea of European drivers it had to find African drivers of whom there were very few
The firms were hesitant to employ them even if they were experienced because lot of responsibility had to be delegated to them for instance in case of breakdowns and accidents.48 It was also 45 counted 14 road stations against 74 line stations in Sierra Leone VAN DER LAAN 1978 20-24 Of these 14 four were located in mining areas The firms could have established far more road stations if they had wanted because many new roads were built 46 heard of one British lorry driver but he was employed by the Methodist Mission Of course there were economic considerations as well European drivers were expensive and their salaries could not be earned back quickly with lorries that carried only one or two tons 47 Weekes Motor Transport Service in Nigeria not trading firm! was an exception PEDLER 1974 256 This firm believed that European drivers were cheaper than Nigerians HAY 1971 loo) 48 LUGARD 1926 47 felt that African drivers should be employed but only for short journeys so that the vehicles were back at the depot each night found that instructions not to carry passengers put African drivers in an awkward position.49
Poor communication was another problem of the road stations We have seen that the telegraph was boon for the railway nrms who found the road stations which were rarely on the telegraph step backwards Messages had to be sent by lorry or if these broke down or if the roads were impassable by runner This reduced overall control by the general manager if the buying price had to be changed he could pass the new price on to the managers of the line stations within 24 hours but it was uncertain when the managers of the outstations would get the message This was an unwelcome complication for centralized firm But the situation for the station manager was not ideal either He felt isolated in the bush He had to take many decisions on his own and if he fell ill he had to travel in shaking lorry to get proper medical care sus pect that European employees disliked the idea of being posted to an outstation
The general manager could and did resort to African candidates50 but as with the drivers suspect certain reluctance to appoint them at this level All reasons to have as few outstations as possible But was it necessary for the nrms to open road stations It seemed possible for the firms to benefit from the new motor roads even if they possessed no road stations for if small traders were prepared to establish trading posts along these roads the volume of produce was likely to rise and with the feeder roads being cul-de-sac roads all of it was bound to be offered for sale at the line stations of the firms
The general managers judged that the emergence of the intermediaries as propose to call these small traders would save them the trouble of advancing along the motor roads co-operation between the firms and the intermediaries seemed the ideal formula for increased trade
The general managers of the may have aimed at voluntary co-operation but at the back of their minds they knew that they could enforce their will if necessary because the geographical dependence of the feeder roads entailed the economic dependence of the intermediaries on the firms
The considerations which have attributed to the general managers are not easily verifiable but fortunately one feature of the inter-war produce trade is amply discussed in the literature
The firms supported the intermediaries with capital not indiscriminately but on contractual basis
If an intermediary signed contract with firm he became 49 former general manager of UAC in Sierra Leone Mr Minall told me in 1972 about gruesome accident with lorry of his firm which had happened upcountry in 1922 or 1923 Many passengers had been killed or wounded The general manager then decided not to buy any more lorries for the time being The firm did without them for two or three years Another problem was the absence of insurance companies and third party policies 50 The African and Eastern Trade Corporation put an African storekeeper in charge at an important road station at Kailahun in 1928 Letter from Mr Fleming former employee of AETC of May 1974 tied trader or sous-tyaitant in French To be tied to well-known firm was reason for pride.51 tied trader promised to sell all his produce to his firm and to buy all his merchandise from it
The transport situation narrowed this down to personal relation between the intermediary and the station manager of his firm in the nearest railway town The intermediary was willing to sign the contract because it helped him to get working capital advances to buy produce credit to buy merchandise and hire purchase terms if the firm sold lorries Mars 1948 io2
The firm on the other hand was willing to sign the contract because it prevented competition tying created as many separate markets as there were firms represented in the railway town Tying promised the firms indirect but effective control over the produce of the feeder roads
The considerations above appear to provide complete explanation of the halting traders frontier
Further research is necessary to deter mine which view carried more weight in the firms the European view of the directors see interpretation above or the African view of the general managers But whatever explanation may be found the halting frontier of the trading firms had significant implications for the organization of the produce trade as we shall see now
The Intermediaries and the Firms
The intermediaries who filled the vacuum when the firms did not advance along the new motor roads were mixed group Africans were in the majority in the Gold Coast Dahomey and Nigeria assume that most of them came from elsewhere that is they were stranger traders and not local traders difference which might easily escape the notice of European observers Farther west from Ivory Coast to Senegal there were many Lebanese and sprinkling of Europeans.52 This social variety should not blind us to the economic homogeneity of the group It is also necessary to distinguish the 19th-century middlemen from the 20th-cen tury intermediaries
While the former had their base on the coast the latter operated in the interior Again the former used indigenous modes of transport caravans canoes and boats but the latter used the imported lorry Finally the former had traded on equal terms with Europeans for many decades while the latter developed from position of dependence on them Of course some of the old middlemen or their sons may have 51 often noticed pride when Lebanese told me to which firm his father or uncle had been tied Having been brought up on the virtues of free competition could not help being surprised 52 There were dozen Frenchmen and Swiss in Sierra Leone VAN DER LAAN 1978 i8 Only few of the European intermediaries survived the crisis of 1930 and the majority of these turned to non-commercial activities They were an interesting group but not significant in economic terms have treated Lebanese and Africans as well as self-employed Europeans as one group
Normally they are treated separately The tendency to do so derives from sociology where it makes good sense to distinguish non-Africans from Africans But in economics one should be cautious with this dichotomy become intermediaries but it is nevertheless useful to make this distinction The intermediaries were successful much more so than is generally recognized If we try to measure their success in absolute terms the depression of the tends to distort our findings It is therefore more appropriate to measure success in relative terms for instance in relation to the firms have come to the conclusion that the intermediaries as group were more successful than the firms in the inter-war period and that their growing economic strength became matter of great concern for the firms arrived at this conclusion on the basis of my research Sierra Leone later found confirmation for my point of view in developments elsewhere in West Africa e.g in the Gold Coast Before going into detail would like to argue that the firms decision not to advance along the motor roads was mistake because in this way they created favourable conditions for potential rivals
If the firms had studied their own history they would have recognized the danger Why did they themselves decide on forward policy the period 1880-1920 Presumably because of the economic advantages But then it was plausible that the intermediaries would benefit just as well from forward policy For if in the past it had been advantageous to buy produce from hitherto isolated and commercially inexperienced farmers the inter mediaries were now meeting farmers in the same condition
In short the non-European intermediaries were following the European example It was probable that this would pay off Turning to actual developments we must first mention another aspect of produce evacuation
In the literature the typical pattern of evacua tion has been compared with the drainage system of river Walker 1959 .53 All water reached the sea at one point and any drop of water had pre-determined route whereby it reached the sea The same occurred with produce any parcel of produce had pre-determined route along which it reached the export harbour It was on this that the firms relied when they left the feeder roads to the intermediairies But it proved miscalculation as we shall see now
The early motor roads were primarily built for produce evacuation but of course they could be used by travellers as well Most of the people who could afford to travel by car at that time were Europeans They complained about the cul-de-sac roads and asked the government for linking the feeder roads to each other These were built in due course This change in road building policy meant that the old one-direction evacuation pattern was mutilated Henceforth parcels of produce could be carried to the export harbour along more than one route Apparently alternative routes with more miles of road were preferred because the share of lorry transport increased This may be concluded from the fact that several colonial governments became concerned about the falling 53 SuRET-CANALE 1964 251 uses the image of lung share of the railway.54 The officials thought in terms of road-rail competi tion which also occurred in Europe in the inter-war period They began to restrict lorry traffic by taxation licensing and road tolls in order to preserve railway revenue.55
It is facile however to analyse this problem simply in terms of transport competition
It should be seen in the context of the produce trade Van der Laan 1975 134-135 The intermediaries discovered that it was profitable to use new evacuation routes Whereas formerly there had been only one town where they could offer their produce for sale there were now two or more Perhaps the buying price schedules for the various line and river stations will be found one day in the archives of the firms These could show beyond doubt why produce was diverted For the time being we simply suppose that there were some margins and that the intermediaries made the most of it To divert produce was easiest for the men who possessed their own lorry but their success soon inspired others
Thus the flexibility of the lorry helped the great majority of the intermediaries to escape from the old one-direction evacuation pattern As result the economic dependence on the firms disappeared to large extent.56
In the cocoa areas of the Gold Coast the intermediaries found another way of getting the better of the firms They began to keep an eye on the world market and discovered how to benefit from price changes They held back cocoa in rising market and delivered it in falling market Noweli Report 1938 107-108139 Since the firms were obliged by their own traditions to accept delivery at the time chosen by the seller57 they could not avoid losses at least not if the intermediaries had correctly foreseen the direction in which prices were going ibid. 107-108
The losses of the firms became disastrous in the 1930 ibid. éï Being reduced to defensive position the firms decided to join forces In 1937 they signed cocoa-buying agreement with two significant elements The first element which is well known but has no direct relevance to this article was the fixing of common buying prices and the consequent restriction of competition This aroused storm of protest in the Gold Coast and led to the downfall of the scheme ibid. 56 63
The second element concerned the link between world prices and buying prices in Africa
The firms felt that changes in the former should be reflected in 54 See VAN DER LAAN 1975 133-135 for Sierra Leone HAY 1971 éï for Nigeria GOULD 1960 7î for the Gold Coast In Sierra Leone the combination of lorry and inland water transport was very effective As we said before the firms were willing to turn to slow but cheap water transport when produce prices were low Where the firms were no longer loyal to the railways the latter were in dire straights 55 The restrictions in Senegal were probably the most severe PHEFFER 1975 464-465) 56 Compare the use of dhows on Lake Victoria in the late FORD 1955 38-45) 57 When the seller came the personnel could not turn him away lied traders in particular had to be helped as soon as possible the produce areas as soon as possible top employee in London was charged with studying the world market and changing the basic price when this seemed necessary
The new price was then cabled to Accra and Lagos and relayed to the station managers who adjusted their buying prices at once ibid. 92-93 138).58 We mentioned this earlier as an example of extreme centralization.
It was hoped that speed of communication would give the firms an advantage over the intermediaries when it came to forecasting price trends In this way speculation by the intermediaries could be prevented This second element was never properly tested because of the early dissolution of the agreement
The concept of countervailing power Galbraith 1957 -in is the most appropriate one to describe the power of the intermediaries vis-a-vis the firms.59 The mere presence of the firms or rather the continuity to which they were committed by their material assets and goodwill pro vided stepping stone for these newcomers While the firms formed solid stable element the produce trade with many long-established rules and practices the intermediaries could change their policies over night and often did so
In the eyes of the firms they were opportunistic and disloyal always trying to drive better bargain on prices and to shift as many cost items as possible to the firms They profited from the umbrella provided by the firms but did not contribute to its costs
The new power of the intermediaries manifested itself in the interior at the frontier of the Inner Trading Zone This must be emphasized because contemporary economists looked for their power at the export stage.60 And since few intermediaries became exporters in the inter-war period let alone large exporters the position of the European firms seemed unchallenged
The concept of countervailing power enables us to adopt new perspective and to arrive at different conclusions In spite of the growing strength of the intermediaries the firms managed to maintain the frontier of the Inner Trading Zone the highwater mark of their advance for some twenty-five years.61 Only then i.e around 1950 did they begin to withdraw from upcountry The buying stations in which they had operated for several decades were sold or let.62 Trading was confined to the ports and few central towns In historical perspective however it was major change
The advance of the period 1880-1920 was followed by retreat in the 1950 and The withdrawal has often been explained by the emergence of the marketing boards63 but am sure that the firms would also have withdrawn if these organizations had never been established It must be remembered that the firms were no longer in direct contact with the farmers this contact had been an important reason for the advance into the interior Again network of stations meant that firm had to meet large number of shrewd and experienced intermediaries at many points Was it not better to shorten the lines and meet them at only few points
The withdrawal of the firms should finally be related to change in transport
The number of lorries in West Africa increased quickly in the when war shortages had come to an end Moreover the carrying capacity grew in Sierra Leone in 1949 the lorries were mainly threetonners but in 1955 they were five-tonners Van der Laan 1975 345 139 But more important was the change in road-building policy Many governments embarked on the construction of trunk roads which led to the capital city Taaffe et al 1963 505).64 If this also happened to be the export harbour produce could be lorried straight to the docks.65 As lorries became more competitive their share in the transport market increased at the expense of the railways and the river fleets.ââ
The firms withdrawal during the and can be discussed in terms of the analysis of section Non-European transport the new lorries were mainly owned by Africans and Lebanese grew at the expense of European transport the railways and the river fleets
In most countries these modes of transport once the modern transport of West Africa could not survive unless they were subsidized by the government At the same time the old pattern of produce evacuation broke down Produce bought by the firms at their line and river stations was increas ingly evacuated by lorry67 these buying stations became road stations terms of our definition It could be said that the Outer Trading Zone swallowed up the Inner Trading Zone leaving the intermediaries as the great beneficiaries of the change In these circumstances the firms saw 63 UAC Statistical and Economic Review 23 1959) 45 In the French colonies where kind of Marketing Board was established in the only the nrms began to withdraw before that time at least in Senegal VAN CHI-BONNARDEL 1978 770-771) 64 The desire for political integration of the country was an important motive behind the construction of trunk roads 65 In West Nigeria this happened already in 1937 HAY 1971 loz) 66 Inland navigation in Sierra Leone experienced serious decline The launches saw in 1970 were all old and dilapidated 67 In some cases this required permission from the Marketing Boards The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board began to favour road transport in the mid- VAN DER LAAN 1975 55) no reason to retain their upcountry stations And so withdrawal cancelled the advance of the past Concentrating on technical and economic questions have examined the literature on West Africa in order to nnd material relating to modern transport and the nrms As was to be expected the results are uneven some topics received attention from many authors while other topics were practically overlooked This paper may help to redress the balance More important however is the fact that some of my findings deviate from the views expressed or implied in the literature would like to review these briefly First from the perspective adopted in this paper it appears that the nrms reached their zenith in the 1920 that is about half-way the colonial period
By that time the retreat and decline of the firms could have been forecast because they allowed vacuum to arise which acted as an incubator for the intermediaries Although other perspectives may be adopted leading to different date for the zenith68 the present per spective is an important one in comprehensive history of the firms Secondly have grouped number of topics under the heading river-based advance Some of these topics have appealed to general historians because they occurred when the European powers were not yet fully committed to policy of territorial expansion in Africa have argued that also for economic historians the river-based advance is the most interesting one because proportionately it demanded more capital than either the railway-or the road-based advance Further research is necessary to determine the composition and growth of the river fleets This will improve our understanding of the aspirations and fears of the investing firms and provide better background for their attempts to persuade their home governments to occupy the interior Thirdly have shown that the firms may be divided into railway and river firms
The distinction is particularly useful in countries such as Senegal Sierra Leone and Nigeria where firms of either type have operated But broader hypotheses may be considered as well it is likely that the greater efficiency of the railway firms was an advantage for the countries in which they operated This may also have benefited the average produce farmer Fourthly it is instructive to distinguish separate group of inter mediaries and to define them in economic terms namely as produce traders who depended on lorries for transport This enables us to distinguish them from the older middlemen It is then possible to recognize decline of the middlemen during the first two phases of the 68 CoQUERY-ViDROviTCH i975 610-611 puts the zenith of CFAO and SCOA the period 1947-1951 The Korea boom boosted profits at the end of this period in particular in the French colonies where there were no Marketing Boards yet advance of the firms as well as the ascent of the intermediaries during the third phase
In my analysis the early downward and the later upward trend do not present paradox any more. 69 Fifthly have argued that the intermediaries became serious threat to the firms in the 1930
This contrasts with the general view that low prices and the crisis of 1930 were the principal problem of the firms one which they successfully overcame by reorganization amalgamation and co-operation among themselves. This interpretation throws new light on government intervention in the inter-war period suspect that the firms wanted the government to assume the role of umpire in the produce trade to protect them against the intermediaries would there fore plead for systematic study of government intervention in this period This is no mean task but it is essential to supplement our picture of the trading firms and of trade general during the colonial period 
